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Abstract
This paper studies the eects of liberalization of trade and foreign
direct investment (FDI) in a model where multiple oligopolistic sectors
compete for a common factor. In contrast to the case of a xed factor
price, trade liberalization is shown to improve the host country's wel-
fare by beneting the consumers and rms while the opposite applies
to FDI liberalization. Then, we nd that simultaneous liberalization
of trade and FDI improves world welfare since the positive eect of
trade liberalization dominates the negative eect of FDI liberalization.
This result suggests that trade liberalization must be accommodated
in order to promote FDI liberalization.
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1 Introduction
The current world economy is characterized by two outstanding facts, among
others. First, foreign direct investment (FDI) is playing a growing role, which
is stressed in UNCTAD (2014, p. 1) stating that `Global FDI ows rose by 9
per cent in 2013 to $1.45 trillion, up from $1.33 trillion in 2012   ' although
they had declined from 2008 to 2012 due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Broth-
ers. WTO (2014, p. 43) also reports that `Four-fths of world trade are now
channelled through multinationals that locate various stages or tasks of the
production process in the most cost-ecient locations around the planet.'
Second, protective trade measures have been substantially reduced through
multilateral GATT/WTO negotiations and preferential trade agreements.1
While it is conventionally recognized that trade and/or FDI liberalization
benets an individual country and the world, is the same valid particularly
in the presence of multinational rms that have a large market share?2
This paper seeks welfare implications of trade and FDI liberalization in
an oligopoly model with the following features. First, we endogenize the
factor price by supposing that multiple oligopolistic industries compete for a
common factor. Second, exports and FDI coexist, and the fraction of FDI is
endogenously determined. Within this model, we examine the welfare eect
of trade and FDI liberalization on the host and source countries, and the
world, and prove the following results. First, trade liberalization increases
consumer surplus, rm prots and welfare of the host country, but FDI lib-
eralization decreases all of these. This contrasts with the existing result that
both trade and FDI liberalization harms the host country by shifting do-
mestic prots abroad. Second, simultaneous liberalization of trade and FDI
1Baier and Bergstrand (2001) empirically nd that about 25% of world trade growth
is explained by tari reductions.
2According to UNCTAD (2014), the ve largest multinationals are General Electric
(US), Royal Dutch Shell (UK), Toyota (Japan), Exxon Mobile (US) and Total SA (France)
all of which arguably have substantial market power in the world market.
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leads to a world welfare improvement although FDI liberalization alone low-
ers the world welfare. This nding has practical relevance in the sense that it
suggests that trade liberalization must be accompanied if FDI liberalization
is to be promoted.3
Since the literature on FDI is too large, we select the most closely related
studies.4 Dei (1990), Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and Brainard (1997)
are the earliest works to analyze the choice between exporting and FDI in
an oligopoly model. Since these papers commonly assume that FDI incurs
a xed cost but avoids a trade cost, the incentive and eect of FDI depend
on the relative magnitude between the xed cost of FDI and the trade cost.5
Markusen (1997) develops a Cournot model with free entry, nding that trade
and FDI liberalization has an opposite eect on endogenous variables, and
that simultaneous liberalization of trade and FDI has a welfare eect that
is quite dierent from trade or FDI liberalization alone. Markusen (2002)
further investigates the welfare eect of FDI liberalization, and concludes
that the country with a larger factor endowment is more likely to lose from
FDI liberalization.6
While the literature above utilizes a partial equilibrium model, Glass and
Saggi (1999) compute and characterize the optimal FDI policies by incorpo-
rating FDI into the model of Dixit and Grossman (1986). Glass and Saggi
(1999) are notable in the sense that they allow the coexistence of exporting
and FDI, and that the general equilibrium eect is taken into account by
assuming multiple oligopolistic industries that compete for a common fac-
3This result may be comparable to Ishikawa et al. (2010) who show that simultaneous
reductions of trade and FDI costs are benecial while trade liberalization alone can be
welfare-reducing.
4See Wong (1995, Ch. 13), Markusen (1995, 2002, 2010), Antras and Yeaple (2014) for
comprehensive surveys.
5Helpman et al. (2004) revisit this issue in a Melitz (2003) model of monopolistic
competition with rm heterogeneity. Liu and Qiu (2013) and Ahn (2014) extend the model
of Helpman et al. (2004) so as to examine the eect of trade and FDI liberalization.
6Egger et al. (2007) extend Markusen's (1997, 2002) model, and their simulation shows
that bilateral FDI liberalization is more attractive than unilateral FDI liberalization.
3
tor.7 While Glass and Saggi (1999, 2004, 2014) assume that (i) only the
third country consumes the imperfectly competitive goods, that (ii) all the
oligopolistic industries are symmetric, and that (iii) goods trade is free, we
consider the eect of trade and FDI liberalization by relaxing these assump-
tions, and establish some results regarding the welfare eects of trade and
FDI liberalization that are not found in the previous works.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Section
3 considers the welfare eects of trade and FDI liberalization. Section 4
concludes, and the detailed proofs of the main results are left in Appendix.
2 Model
Mainly resorting to Dixit and Grossman (1986) and Glass and Saggi (1999),
this section constructs a model. Suppose a world consisting of Home (host
country) and Foreign (source country), and m + n duopolistic industries,
which are divided into m  1 industries where the Foreign rm engages in
both exporting and FDI and n  1 industries where the Foreign rm just
exports. The utility function of the Home consumer is quasi-linear:
m+nX
i=1
u(ci) + z;
where ci is consumption of oligopolistic good i, z is consumption of the
numeraire good, and function u() satises u0() > 0 and u00() < 0. Utility
maximization yields an inverse demand function of goods i and j:
pi = p(xi + x

i ); pj = p(xj + x

j);
where xi; xj and x

i ; x

j are outputs of the Home and Foreign rms in industry
i and j, respectively. The Home government imposes an (specic) import
7Linking the good and factor markets in a third market model of Brander and Spencer
(1985), Dixit and Grossman (1986) endogenize the factor price, and provide a counter-
argument on strategic export subsidy. Glass and Saggi (2004, 2014) modify the model in
Glass and Saggi (1999) to study the FDI policies between multiple source or host countries.
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tari t and an investment tax  on good i 2 f1;    ;mg whereas free trade
prevails in industry j 2 fm+ 1;    ;m+ ng.
The Foreign rm in industry i 2 f1;    ;mg simultaneously undertakes
both FDI and exporting so that  2 [0; 1] fraction of output is supplied
through FDI and 1  fraction of output is supplied by exporting. In addition,
the factor coecient of all oligopolistic rms is assumed to be unity. Then,
denoting by r and r the factor price in Home and Foreign, the prot of the
Home and Foreign rms is dened by
i  p(xi + xi )xi   rxi (1)
i  p(xi + xi )xi   [(r + ) + (r + t)(1  )]xi ; (2)
for industry i 2 f1;    ;mg, and the counterparts in industry j 2 fm +
1;    ;m+ ng are
j  p(xj + xj)xj   rxj (3)
j  p(xj + xj)xj   rxj : (4)
When all the rms play a Cournot-Nash game, the rst-order conditions
are
xip
0(xi + xi ) + p(xi + x

i )  r = 0
xi p
0(xi + xi ) + p(xi + x

i )  (r + )   (r + t)(1  ) = 0
xjp
0(xj + xj) + p(xj + x

j)  r = 0
xjp
0(xj + xj) + p(xj + x

j)  r = 0:
Note here that r+  and r+ t must be equalized if the degree of FDI  is an
interior solution; the Foreign rm specializes in exporting if r+ > r+t and
vice versa if r +  < r + t. And, following Dixit and Grossman (1986), we
assume that r is endogenously determined so that the Home factor market
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clears but that r is exogenous:8
mxi + nxj +mx

i = k; (5)
where k is the xed factor supply. In this equation, mxi + nxj represents
factor demand of the Home rms, and mxi is factor demand of the Foreign
multinational rm. The model is closed by substituting r = r + t    into
the four rst-order conditions:
xip
0(xi + xi ) + p(xi + x

i )  r   t+  = 0 (6)
xi p
0(xi + xi ) + p(xi + x

i )  r   t = 0 (7)
xjp
0(xj + xj) + p(xj + x

j)  r   t+  = 0 (8)
xjp
0(xj + xj) + p(xj + x

j)  r = 0: (9)
Our model comprises Eqs. (5)-(9), which determine xi; x

i ; xj; x

j and .
3 Trade and FDI Liberalization
This section examines the eects of a reduction of t and  . Note that our
model has a recursive structure such that xi and x

i are determined in Eqs.
(6) and (7), and xj and x

j are determined in Eqs. (8) and (9), and then Eq.
(5) uniquely determines , given the predetermined variables xi; x

i ; xj and
xj . Therefore, the eects of a small change in t and  are simply computed
as follows."
xip
00
i + 2p
0
i xip
00
i + p
0
i
xi p
00
i + p
0
i x

i p
00
i + 2p
0
i
# "
dxi
dxi
#
=
"
1
1
#
dt+
"  1
0
#
d"
xjp
00
j + 2p
0
j xjp
00
j + p
0
j
xjp
00
j + p
0
j x

jp
00
j + 2p
0
j
# "
dxj
dxj
#
=
"
1
0
#
dt+
"  1
0
#
d:
At this stage, we make an assumption familiar in the oligopoly theory:
8The case in which r and r are endogenous is briey commented in the concluding
section; this case yields nothing clear.
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Assumption. xip
00
i + p
0
i; x

i p
00
i + p
0
i; xjp
00
j + p
0
j and x

jp
00
j + p
0
j are all negative.
Then, the comparative statics outcomes are obtained as
@xi
@t
=
 (xi   xi )p00i + p0i
i
;
@xi
@t
=
(xi   xi )p00i + p0i
i
(10)
@xi
@
=  x

i p
00
i + 2p
0
i
i
> 0 ;
@xi
@
=
xi p
00
i + p
0
i
i
< 0 (11)
@xj
@t
=
xjp
00
j + 2p
0
j
j
< 0 ;
@xj
@t
=  x

jp
00
j + p
0
j
j
> 0 (12)
@xj
@
=  x

jp
00
j + 2p
0
j
j
> 0 ;
@xj
@
=
xjp
00
j + p
0
j
j
< 0; (13)
where i  (xip00i +xi p00i +3p0i)p0i > 0 and j  (xjp00j +xjp00j +3p0j)p0j > 0 are
the coecient determinant of the totally dierentiated systems above. These
results will be made use of in deriving and interpreting the welfare eects of
trade and FDI liberalization.
We now dene welfare of each country. First of all, Home consumer
surplus CS is dened by
CS  m
"Z xi+xi
0
p(X)dX   (xi + xi )p(xi + xi )
#
+n
"Z xj+xj
0
p(X)dX   (xj + xj)p(xj + xj)
#
: (14)
Next, the prot of oligopolistic rms is dened by
i = [p(xi + xi)  r   t+  ]xi ; j = [p(xj + xj)  r   t+  ]xj (15)
i = [p(xi + x

i )  r   t]xi ; j = [p(xj + xj)  r]xj ; (16)
where use is made of the condition r +  = r + t.
The third welfare component is factor income. Noting that employed
factor Home is xed to k, but that employed factor of Foreign is given by
m(1 )xi +nxj and not necessarily equal to the factor endowment k, factor
income in Home and Foreign is dened as follows.
Home factor income = rk = (r + t  )k (17)
Foreign factor income = r[m(1  )xi + nxj ]: (18)
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Finally, government revenue from trade and investment taxes is
Home tax revenue = tm(1  )xi + mxi : (19)
Summing (15), (17) and (19) up leads to national income of Home I:9
I = mp(xi + x

i )xi + np(xj + x

j)xj + r
(k  mxi   nxj) + tmxi : (20)
Similarly, summing (16) and (18) yields national income of Foreign, which
also represents Foreign welfare W :
W  = mp(xi + xi )x

i + np(xj + x

j)x

j   r(k  mxi   nxj)  tmxi : (21)
Using these expressions, Home welfareW is given byW = CS+I, and world
welfare is given by W +W .
In deriving the welfare eect of trade and FDI liberalization, we employ a
convenient strategy of Ishikawa et al. (2010) in which the eects on consumer
surplus and rm prots are rst addressed, and then the eects on welfare
are considered. The rst result we establish concerns the eect of trade and
FDI liberalization on consumer surplus of Home. This is summarized in:10
Proposition 1. Trade liberalization raises consumer surplus of Home, but
FDI liberalization lowers it.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. From the condition r =
r + t   and the prot maximization conditions (6) and (7), a tari reduc-
tion decreases marginal cost of both Home and Foreign rms in industry i.
Hence, total output necessarily increase while it is ambiguous whether each
rm's output increases.11 Analogously, the rst-order conditions (8) and (9)
convince us that a tari reduction also increases total output in industry j
9The detailed derivation of (20) and (21) is left in Appendix.
10The proofs of all propositions are provided in Appendix.
11If demand is linear (p00i = 0), both rms' output increases.
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because output expansion of the Home rm is larger than output contraction
of the Foreign rm. As a result, total output in all industries expands, and
thus the Home consumer gains from trade liberalization.
If, in contrast, FDI is liberalized, the opposite reasoning applies. From
Eqs. (6)-(9), it is obvious that a reduction of investment tax decreases the
Home rm's output and increases the Foreign rm's output in industries
i and j since the Home rm's marginal cost rises. Because the negative
eect on the Home rm's output dominates the positive eect on the Foreign
rm's output, both total output and Home consumer surplus decrease as the
investment tax is reduced.
Let us next examine how reduced taris and investment taxes aect Home
rms' prots. This is stated in:
Proposition 2. Trade liberalization raises the prot of all Home rms, but
FDI liberalization lowers it.
As mentioned earlier, a tari reduction lowers marginal cost of the Home
rm i and the price of Good i. However, the former eect is larger than
the latter eect, and thus the Home rm i makes more prots after trade
liberalization. In contrast, it is straightforward to nd that a tari reduction
also increases the prot of the Home rm j since reduced taris increase the
Home rm's output by reducing its marginal cost.
Since the Home factor price is endogenously determined in the present
model, it makes sense to look at the eect on the factor income rk. Noting
the condition r = r + t   , it is trivial that
Proposition 3. Trade liberalization lowers the factor income of Home, but
FDI liberalization raises it.
Thus far, we have conned attention to the eects of trade and FDI liber-
alization on the components of Home welfare. Before turning to considering
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the eect on welfare, we now examine the eect on the rm prots and factor
income of Foreign. The following two propositions summarize the eects on
the rm prots and factor income of Foreign, respectively.
Proposition 4. Trade and FDI liberalization raises the prot of the For-
eign rms that engage in exporting and FDI. Trade liberalization lowers the
prot of the Foreign rms that engage in exporting only, but FDI liberaliza-
tion raises it.
Proposition 5. Trade liberalization raises the factor income of Foreign, but
FDI liberalization lowers it.
Proposition 4 straightforwardly comes from Eqs. (6) and (9). On the one
hand, tari reductions lower marginal cost of both the Home and Foreign
rms in industry i, yielding a higher prot for the Foreign rm that engage
in exporting and FDI. If, on the other hand, the investment tax is reduced,
the Home rm's marginal cost rises, and hence the Foreign rm in industry
i gains from FDI liberalization as well.
It is easy to understand the competing eect of trade and FDI liberaliza-
tion on the Foreign rms that specialize in exporting. When a tari (resp.
investment tax) is reduced, marginal cost of the Home rm in industry j
decreases (resp. increases), which, in turn, leads to a decrease (resp. an
increase) in the Foreign rms' prot in industry j.
Proposition 5 is also a natural observation. If Home reduces an import
tari (resp. investment tax), the Foreign rms in industry i nd it more
protable to produce in the source country (resp. host country) by employing
the Foreign factor (resp. Home factor). Accordingly, liberalization of trade
(resp. FDI) encourages (resp. discourages) the Foreign employment and
factor income.
We are now in a position to discuss the eect of trade and FDI liberaliza-
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tion on overall welfare of each country, but it is impossible to obtain a clear
result under general demand. But, if we assume linear demand, the following
proposition can be established.
Proposition 6. Under linear demand, trade liberalization raises welfare of
Home, but FDI liberalization lowers it. The eect of trade and FDI liberal-
ization on Foreign welfare is ambiguous.
In the case where factor prices are not aected by policy changes, liberaliza-
tion of trade and/or FDI reduces Home welfare and improves Foreign wel-
fare by shifting the Home rms' prots abroad. However, this argument no
longer applies to the present model because the trade and FDI liberalization
inuences the factor price of Home. In particular, it is worth stressing that
trade liberalization improves Home welfare because this nding is sharply
contrasting to the conventional outcome mentioned above. The reason for
welfare-improving trade liberalization is that tari reductions increase con-
sumer surplus and the prots of all the Home rms, which dominate the
negative eect on the factor income.12 On the contrary, FDI liberalization
inevitably becomes detrimental since the negative eect on consumer surplus
and the Home rms' prots are larger than the positive eect on the factor
income.
Finally, the eect of trade and FDI liberalization on the world welfare is
derived. The following result can hold under general demand.
Proposition 7. Trade liberalization raises the world welfare, but FDI liber-
alization lowers it. Simultaneous liberalization of trade and FDI raises the
world welfare.
12The eect on government revenue is ambiguous.
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This result is comparable with that of Ishikawa et al. (2010). Incor-
porating post-production services into a Bertrand model, Ishikawa et al.
(2010) demonstrate that simultaneous liberalization of trade and FDI benets
the world economy although trade liberalization alone can be world-welfare-
reducing. After proving this result, Ishikawa et al. (2010, p. 80) provide a
novel implication that `making progress on the liberalization of service FDI
under GATS (General Agreement on Trade and Service) is crucial to secure
positive welfare consequences of the trade liberalization under GATT/WTO.'
Our result is qualitatively dierent from theirs in the sense that FDI liber-
alization alone is welfare-reducing but that liberalization of both trade and
FDI is welfare-enhancing. However, both it is worth commenting that the
results in Ishikawa et al. (2010) and this paper both point out that the com-
plementary role of GATS and GATT/WTO is quite important for successful
trade and FDI liberalization.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have explored welfare eects of trade and FDI liberalization in a two-
country oligopolistic model that emphasizes the linkage between the goods
and factor markets. By assuming multiple oligopolies that compete for a
common factor, we have endogenized the factor price, and shown that trade
liberalization can improve welfare of the host country whereas FDI liberal-
ization has the opposite welfare eect. In addition, we have established that
simultaneous liberalization of trade and FDI benets the world whereas FDI
liberalization alone is world-welfare-reducing.
While this paper may oer some useful insights into trade and FDI liber-
alization, they rest on a number of specic assumptions and much needs to be
made for a more satisfactory analysis. First, one may wonder if our results
are valid when the factor price of both Home and Foreign is endogenized.
Although this full general equilibrium in the world economy is possible to
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compute, the welfare eects of trade and FDI liberalization turn to be less
transparent. All we can say is that the world gains from liberalization of ei-
ther trade or FDI or both; the welfare eects on each country are ambiguous.
Second, it would be interesting to check our results in Bertrand competition.
Third, we have focused on an investment tax as a FDI policy, but other
types of FDI policies, e.g. local content requirements, are worth addressing.
Third, this paper has paid no attention to cross-border merger and acquisi-
tion, which are the other important type of FDI. Finally, we have assumed a
quasi-linear utility function, following the modeling of Dixit and Grossman
(1986) and Glass and Saggi (1999). In contrast, Neary (2009) develops an
oligopolistic model that utilizes a non-quasi-linear preference and a linkage
between the goods and factor markets. It is quite interesting to consider
the welfare eects of trade and FDI liberalization in his general oligopolistic
equilibrium model. These tasks are left as important research agenda in the
near future.
5 Appendix
5.1 Derivation of (20) and (21)
National income of Home consists of the prots of the oligopolistic rms,
factor income, and government revenue from trade and investment taxes:
I  mi + nj + rk + tm(1  )xi + mxi
= m(pixi   rxi) + n(pjxj   rxj) + rk + tm(1  )xi + mxi
= mpixi + npjxj + r(k  mxi   nxj) + tmxi   (t  )mxi
= mp(xi + x

i )xi + np(xj + x

j)xj + r
(k  mxi   nxj) + tmxi ;
where the second line uses the denition of i and j, and the last line follows
from the factor market-clearing condition of Home (5) and the condition
r   t +  = r. In a similar way, national income (welfare) of Foreign is
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derived as follows.
W   mi + nj + r[m(1  )xi + nxj ]
= m[pix

i   (r + t)xi ] + n(pjxj   rxj) + rmxi + rnxj   rmxi
= mp(xi + x

i )x

i + np(xj + x

j)x

j   r(k  mxi   nxj)  tmxi :
5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In what follows, we use a notation of Xi  xi + xi and Xj  xj + xj .
Dierentiating (14) with respect to t and  yields
@CS
@t
=  mXip0i
@Xi
@t
  nXjp0j
@Xj
@t
=  2mXi(p
0
i)
2
i
  nXj(p
0
j)
2
j
< 0
@CS
@
=  mXip0i
@Xi
@
  nXjp0j
@Xj
@
=
mXi(p
0
i)
2
i
+
nXj(p
0
j)
2
j
> 0;
which leads to Proposition 1.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Dierentiating (15) with respect to t and  and applying the envelope theo-
rem, we have
@i
@t
=
 
p0i
@xi
@t
  1
!
xi =  2xip
0(xi p
00
i + p
0
i)
i
< 0
@j
@t
=
 
p0j
@xj
@t
  1
!
xj =  
xjp
0
j(xjp
00
j + 2x

jp
00
j + 4p
0
j)
j
< 0
@i
@
=
 
p0i
@xi
@
+ 1
!
xi =
xip
0
i(xip
00
i + 2x

i p
00
i + 4p
0
i)
i
> 0
@j
@
=
 
p0j
@xj
@
+ 1
!
xj =
xjp
0
j(xjp
00
j + 2x

jp
00
j + 4p
0
j)
j
> 0:
These inequalities establish Proposition 2.
5.4 Proof of Proposition 3
This is obvious since (17) is increasing in t and decreasing in  .
14
5.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Dierentiating (16) with respect to t and  and using the envelope theorem,
we have
@i
@t
=
 
p0i
@xi
@t
  1
!
xi =  
2xi p
0
i(xip
00
i + p
0
i)
i
< 0
@j
@t
= xjp
0
j
@xj
@t
=
xjp
0
j(x

jp
00
j + 2p
0
j)
j
> 0
@i
@
= xi p
0
i
@xi
@
=  x

i p
0
i(x

i p
00
i + 2p
0
i)
i
< 0
@j
@
= xjp
0
j
@xj
@
=  x

jp
0
j(x

jp
00
j + 2p
0
j)
j
< 0;
from which Proposition 4 follows.
5.6 Proof of Proposition 5
The Foreign factor income, which is given by (18), is rewritten as
r[m(1  )xi + nxj ] = r(mXi + nXj   k)  F ;
by noting that m(1 )xi = mxi +mxi+nxj k from (5). Then, the partial
derivative of F  with respect to t and  is obtained as
@F 
@t
= r
 
m
@Xi
@t
+ n
@Xj
@t
!
= r
 
2mp0i
i
+
np0j
j
!
< 0
@F 
@
= r
 
m
@Xi
@
+ n
@Xj
@
!
=  r
 
mp0i
i
+
np0j
j
!
> 0;
which implies Proposition 5.
5.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Noting that Home welfare is dened byW  CS+I and that Foreign welfare
is dened by (21), tedious manipulations lead to
@W
@t
=  mXip0i
@Xi
@t
  nXjp0j
@Xj
@t
+m
 
xip
0
i
@Xi
@t
+ pi
@xi
@t
!
+ n
 
xjp
0
j
@Xj
@t
+ pj
@xj
@t
!
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0
j
@Xj
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!
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m
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@t
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@xj
@t
!
 mt@x

i
@t
 mxi
=
2m(pi   t)
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  n(2pj   3r
)
3p0j
@W
@
=  mXip0i
@Xi
@
  nXjp0j
@Xj
@
+m
 
xip
0
i
@Xi
@
+ pi
@xi
@
!
+ n
 
xjp
0
j
@Xj
@
+ pj
@xj
@
!
+r
 
 m@xi
@
  n@xj
@
!
+mt
@xi
@
=  m(3pi   3r
   2t)
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  n(pj   r
)
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> 0
@W 
@
= m
 
xi p
0
i
@Xi
@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@xi
@
!
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xjp
0
j
@Xj
@
+ pj
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@
!
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m
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!
 mt@x

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=
m(2pi   3r   2t)
3p0i
+
n(2pj   3r)
3p0j
;
under linear demand such that p00i = p
00
j = 0.
5.8 Proof of Proposition 7
Summing (14), (20) and (21) up, world welfare takes the form
W +W  = CS +mXip(Xi) + nXjp(Xj):
Thus, dierentiating this with respect to t and  , we nd that
@(W +W )
@t
=  mXip0i
@Xi
@t
  nXjp0j
@Xj
@t
+m(Xip
0
i + pi)
@Xi
@t
+ n(Xjp
0
j + pj)
@Xj
@t
=
2mpip
0
i
i
+
npjp
0
j
j
< 0
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@(W +W )
@
= mpi
@Xi
@
+ npj
@Xj
@
=  mpip
0
i
i
  npjp
0
j
j
> 0;
implying that trade liberalization raises the world welfare, but FDI liberaliza-
tion lowers it. If these liberalization policies are simultaneously implemented,
world welfare improves because
@(W +W )
@t
+
@(W +W )
@
=
mpip
0
i
i
< 0:
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